Duty of Confidentiality​

Larry accepted payment from Carla's mother (M) on the condition that M be informed of all aspects of the divorce, including Carla's confidential statements to Larry. This information is protected under the duty of confidentiality. Sharing such information requires the client's informed consent, which is advisable to confirm in writing (and often required under California rules for waivers). Agreeing to M's demand, especially without C's valid informed consent, would compel Larry to reveal confidential information obtained during the representation. Larry likely violated his duty of confidentiality by agreeing to the mother's condition for payment without proper client consent.

Duty Regarding Third-Party Payment​

Lawyers must not accept payment from a third party unless the client gives informed consent (which must be informed written consent in CA), there is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment or the client-lawyer relationship, and client confidentiality is maintained. M's condition directly links payment to the disclosure of confidential information and potentially interferes with L's independent judgment by creating an obligation to the payer. Accepting payment under these conditions without meeting all requirements, especially regarding informed written consent and non-interference, constitutes an ethical breach. Larry likely violated the rules governing acceptance of payment from a third party.

Duty Regarding Termination and Scope of Representation​

Larry sent Carla a disengagement letter after the divorce but simultaneously offered future assistance on related matters and kept her file open. He later provided ongoing legal advice on new issues (tax, support, visitation). This created ambiguity about whether the attorney-client relationship truly ended or continued, at least for post-divorce matters. An attorney has a duty to clearly communicate the status and scope of representation. Failing to definitively terminate the relationship, especially while continuing to provide legal advice, makes it likely Carla remained a current client for some purposes. Larry likely violated his duty to clearly define the scope and status of the attorney-client relationship.

Duty Regarding Sexual Relationships with Clients​

Larry entered into a consensual sexual relationship with Carla after her divorce was final. Both ABA and California rules strictly regulate or prohibit sexual relationships between lawyers and current clients. Given the ambiguity regarding termination and Larry's ongoing legal advice, Carla could reasonably be considered a current client when the sexual relationship began. If so, Larry violated ABA rules. The relationship also creates significant risks under California rules, particularly regarding potential undue influence given Carla's dependency and the potential impact on Larry's professional judgment. Larry likely violated ethical rules by entering into a sexual relationship with someone who was arguably still a current client.

Duty of Competence​

Larry, primarily a divorce lawyer, provided ongoing advice to Carla on tax, child support, and visitation matters. A lawyer must provide competent representation, possessing the necessary legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. If Larry lacked expertise in tax law, providing advice in that area without becoming competent or associating with a competent lawyer constitutes a breach of this duty. Larry likely violated his duty of competence by providing advice in areas outside his primary expertise, such as tax law.

Duty Regarding Business Transactions with Clients​

Larry entered into a partnership agreement with Carla, wherein he provided capital and she ran the business. This constitutes a business transaction with a client (likely current, given ongoing advice and relationship). Such transactions require strict compliance with ethical rules: terms must be fair, fully disclosed in writing; the client must be advised in writing to seek independent legal counsel and given the chance to do so; and the client must give informed written consent to the terms and the lawyer's role. Larry drafted the agreement, suggested Carla could have her mother (not independent counsel) review it (not in writing), and obtained Carla's signature based on trust. This fails to meet the requirements for written disclosure, written advice to seek independent counsel, and properly documented informed written consent. Larry clearly violated the strict rules governing business transactions with a client.

Duty of Loyalty (Conflicts of Interest)​

Larry's personal, sexual, and business relationships with Carla created significant conflicts of interest. His personal interests (romantic and financial) could materially limit his ability to exercise independent professional judgment when advising Carla, whether on the partnership or other legal matters. He failed to obtain the necessary informed written consent to proceed despite these conflicts (required if the conflict is consentable, which is questionable here given the multiple intertwined personal and financial interests). Larry likely violated his duty of loyalty by engaging in relationships and transactions that created conflicts of interest without proper client disclosure and consent.

(750 words)

1

Governing Law​

This case involves an employment contract, which is a contract for services. Therefore, the common law of contracts governs, not the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).

Contract Formation​

A valid contract requires mutual assent (offer and acceptance) and consideration.

• Offer: Delta High's principal telephoned Phil and offered him a one-year temporary position as head of the science department at a salary of $80,000.

• Acceptance: Phil initially stated, "I'm only interested if I can be head of the science department." This could be seen as setting a condition or clarifying the offer he was willing to accept. The principal responded, "Perfect! ... half-time teaching and half-time administration." This likely constituted a specific offer for the Head of Department role with mixed duties. Phil then unequivocally stated, "I accept." This appears to form a contract based on the specific terms discussed orally (Head of Department, $80k, mixed duties, Aug '23 - June '24).

• Consideration: Phil promised his services (teaching and administration), and Delta High promised to pay $80,000. Valid consideration exists.

Based on the phone call, there appears to be mutual assent to a contract for Phil to serve as temporary Head of the Science Department with both teaching and administrative duties.

Statute of Frauds (SoF)​

The Statute of Frauds requires certain types of contracts to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged to be enforceable.

The SoF applies to contracts that, by their terms, cannot be fully performed within one year from the date of their making. Phil's contract was formed around March/April 2023 and was set to run from August 2023 to June 2024. Performance would conclude more than one year after the initial agreement was made (e.g., March 2023 to June 2024 > 1 year). Therefore, this contract falls within the SoF and requires a sufficient writing.

Effect of the May Form​

Delta High might argue the May form constitutes the written contract, making prior oral evidence inadmissible under the Parol Evidence Rule and potentially defining the terms. However, this argument is weak. The contract was formed during the phone call when mutual assent was reached. The form arrived later, initiated by Delta High primarily for payroll purposes. Although signed by the principal when sent, Phil only signed and returned it later as requested. Therefore, even with both signatures eventually, the form doesn't automatically supersede the prior oral agreement as a fully integrated writing intended by both parties to be the final expression of their deal, especially regarding the crucial job role. It appears more administrative or, at best, a unilateral attempt by Delta to introduce terms (like "duties at the discretion of the School") that contradict the specific, agreed-upon Head of Department role. Phil can argue the oral agreement is the contract and the form either fails to satisfy the SoF regarding the essential term of his position or its contradictory terms are ineffective modifications.

Promissory Estoppel as an Exception to SoF​

Even if the SoF is not satisfied by the oral agreement combined perhaps with the form, Phil might argue for enforcement based on promissory estoppel. This requires: (1) a promise made by the defendant; (2) defendant's reasonable expectation that the plaintiff would rely on the promise; (3) plaintiff's actual and reasonable reliance on the promise to their detriment; and (4) injustice can only be avoided by enforcing the promise.

Here, (1) Delta's principal promised Phil the Head of Department position. (2) Delta should have reasonably expected Phil to rely, especially since obtaining administrative experience was his stated goal. (3) Phil detrimentally relied by taking a one-year leave of absence from his job at City High based on Delta's promise. (4) Injustice would result if Phil is left without either job for the year due to his reliance on Delta's promise.

Therefore, Phil has a strong argument for promissory estoppel to overcome the SoF defense due to his clear detrimental reliance.

2. Phil's Available Remedies​

If Phil prevails, he would likely be entitled to remedies designed to compensate him for the breach, primarily expectation damages.

Expectation Damages​

Expectation damages aim to put Phil in the financial position he would have been in had Delta High performed the contract. Generally, this means receiving the value of the promised salary ($80,000) minus any amount Phil earned (or reasonably could have earned) through mitigation efforts. Phil had a duty to mitigate his damages by seeking comparable employment. He rejected Delta's teaching-only offer and a $40,000 coaching job at City High, ultimately taking a $30,000 gardening job. A key issue is whether the $40,000 coaching job was comparable employment; Phil can argue it wasn't, given his goal of gaining administrative experience. If his mitigation (taking the $30k job) was reasonable, damages are $80k - $30k = $50k. If rejecting the $40k job was unreasonable, damages are $80k - $40k = $40k.

Specific Performance​

Specific performance is an equitable remedy compelling a party to perform their contractual obligations. It may be available when monetary damages are inadequate to compensate the non-breaching party. Here, Phil's expectation damages calculated as his lost salary less mitigation, appear fully adequate to compensate him for the financial loss caused by Delta High's breach. Furthermore, specific performance is particularly unnecessary here because the contract was only for a one-year temporary position, a relatively short duration, making monetary compensation a more practical and suitable remedy.

Conclusion​

Phil's most likely remedy is expectation damages. These would likely be calculated as his promised $80,000 salary minus his actual earnings from the gardening job ($30,000), resulting in $50,000. This assumes his rejection of the $40,000 coaching job constituted reasonable mitigation because coaching was not comparable employment given his specific career objectives and the nature of the promised position at Delta High. If a court were to find the coaching job was sufficiently comparable and his rejection unreasonable, his damages would be limited to $40,000.

(950 words)

1

The primary question regarding Lender's mortgage is whether Carlos took title to the house subject to it. The jurisdiction operates under a race-notice recording act. This type of statute protects a subsequent purchaser who pays value for property, takes without notice of a prior conflicting interest, and records their own deed before the prior interest is recorded. When Barry bought the house from Allison, Lender's mortgage had not yet been recorded. Barry paid market price, satisfying the value requirement. Nothing suggests Barry had actual knowledge or was on inquiry notice of the mortgage. Because Lender's mortgage was unrecorded when Barry recorded his deed, Barry also lacked constructive notice. Since Barry was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice who recorded first, he acquired title from Allison free and clear of Lender's unrecorded mortgage under the race-notice statute.

Later, Barry sold the house to Carlos. By the time Carlos finalized his purchase, Lender's mortgage had been recorded for several weeks. In a jurisdiction using a parcel index system, this proper recording provided constructive notice to the world, including Carlos, regardless of whether he actually knew about it. Therefore, Carlos himself does not qualify as a bona fide purchaser without notice relative to Lender's mortgage.

However, Carlos is protected by the Shelter Rule. This common law doctrine allows a grantee who acquires property from a bona fide purchaser (like Barry) to stand in the shoes of their grantor. Carlos takes the same protection against the prior interest (Lender's mortgage) that his grantor, Barry, enjoyed. The purpose of this rule is to ensure the BFP (Barry) can freely transfer the good title he obtained. Even though Carlos had constructive notice of the mortgage when he purchased, he acquired title from Barry, who had already defeated Lender's interest under the recording act. Consequently, Carlos took title to the house free from Lender's mortgage, and Lender's action against Carlos should fail.

2

Carlos's Potential Claims Against Barry Under the General Warranty Deed Carlos received a general warranty deed from Barry. This type of deed contains several covenants, or promises, about the quality of title being conveyed. These typically include present covenants (breached, if at all, at the time of conveyance) like the covenant against encumbrances, and future covenants (breached upon later interference) like the covenant of quiet enjoyment and the covenant of warranty.

Carlos might consider claiming Barry breached the covenant against encumbrances because Lender's mortgage existed and was recorded when Barry sold the house to Carlos. However, an encumbrance must typically be a valid claim against the property to breach the covenant. As established above, due to Barry's status as a BFP who recorded first, Lender's mortgage was legally unenforceable against the title Barry acquired and subsequently conveyed to Carlos. An unenforceable lien generally does not constitute a breach of the covenant against encumbrances. Similarly, Barry did own the property (seisin) and had the right to convey it free of Lender's claim. Thus, the present covenants were likely not breached.

Carlos might also look to the future covenants due to Lender's lawsuit. The covenants of quiet enjoyment and warranty promise that the grantee will not be disturbed by, and the grantor will defend against, lawful claims of superior title. While Lender's lawsuit is certainly a disturbance to Carlos's possession, the claim itself is not lawful or superior against Carlos's title, thanks to the Shelter Rule. Because Lender's claim should ultimately be defeated, Barry's obligations under the future covenants likely have not been triggered. Therefore, Carlos probably has no successful claim against Barry under the general warranty deed based on Lender's mortgage or the resulting lawsuit.

3

The question of Barry's liability for the air conditioning unit turns on whether the unit was a fixture or remained personal property. A fixture is an item of personal property that has been attached to real property in such a way that it becomes legally regarded as part of the real property itself, passing with the land to a buyer. Courts determine fixture status by looking at the method of attachment, the item's adaptation to the use of the property, and, most importantly, the objective intention of the party who installed it.

Here, the AC unit was installed by Allison to improve kitchen ventilation. It was "screwed to a bracket mounted through an exterior wall." This method suggests a fairly permanent installation requiring penetration of the building structure, and its removal would likely leave holes or other damage. The unit was adapted to the house's use by providing cooling and ventilation. Objectively, installing such a unit suggests an intention to make a permanent improvement to the habitability and value of the house. In disputes between a seller and buyer of real estate, courts often presume that items attached in this manner by the owner were intended to remain with the property unless specified otherwise. Since the sales contract between Barry and Carlos was silent on the unit, the analysis points towards it being a fixture.

As a fixture, the AC unit became part of the real property that Barry owned and subsequently contracted to sell to Carlos. Barry's removal of the unit the day before closing, without any agreement allowing him to do so, meant he failed to deliver the property in the condition agreed upon (which includes fixtures). Therefore, Barry is likely liable to Carlos for the value of the air conditioning unit he improperly removed.

(900 words)

1

Under California law, a will or part of a will can be revoked by a subsequent testamentary instrument or by a physical act performed by the testator with revocatory intent. Physical acts include burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will or a portion thereof. Here, Tammy's act of crossing out the "$10,000" figure qualifies as a physical act of cancellation or obliteration, which effectively revoked the original $10,000 bequest.

The issue then becomes the effectiveness of the handwritten "$20,000" figure. While Tammy clearly intended to increase Natalie's gift, this handwritten interlineation does not meet the formal requirements for executing a valid will or codicil under California law. It lacks the necessary witness signatures (unless considered a valid holographic modification, which requires the material provisions to be in the testator's handwriting – here, only the amount, initials, and date are handwritten, likely insufficient). Therefore, the attempt to bequeath $20,000 is invalid.

The situation – where a testator revokes a gift intending to replace it with another that ultimately fails – triggers the doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation (DRR). DRR operates under the presumption that the testator would prefer the original gift to stand rather than have the revocation take effect if the intended replacement fails. It applies when the revocation is conditional upon the validity of the new disposition. Here, it seems highly probable that Tammy crossed out the $10,000 only because she believed she was effectively substituting it with $20,000. Her intent was clearly to benefit Natalie, likely more generously. She would presumably not have wanted Natalie to receive nothing, which would be the result if the revocation stood alone. Because the attempted $20,000 gift is invalid, DRR allows the court to disregard the revocation (the crossing out) as being dependent on a mistaken belief (that the new amount was validly bequeathed). Consequently, the court will likely reinstate the original provision, and Natalie will receive the $10,000 initially specified in the validly executed will.

2

The primary goal in will interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the testator's intent. While the plain meaning of terms is a starting point, California law permits the consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret a will's terms, even if they are not ambiguous on their face, to determine the testator's intent.

Here, the term "coin collection" presents a latent ambiguity when applied to the specific property Tammy owned and how she maintained it. Several pieces of evidence suggest Tammy intended Frank to receive the medals. First, she stored the medals together with the coins in the same album. This physical integration suggests she viewed them as a single collection or unit for practical purposes, regardless of technical definitions. Second, and more significantly, the album contained a typewritten note signed by Tammy stating she wanted Frank "to take care of her album" after her death. While this note likely cannot be formally incorporated by reference into the will (as the will doesn't mention it and it may not have existed when the will was signed), it serves as powerful extrinsic evidence of Tammy's intent regarding the album's contents. Her specific reference to the "album" strongly implies she intended Frank to possess everything within it, which includes both the coins and the medals.

Although most collectors differentiate between coins and medals, Tammy's personal classification and intent, as evidenced by her storage practices and the separate signed note directed at Frank concerning the album, are paramount. The court will likely find that Tammy used the term "coin collection" loosely to refer to the entire contents of the album she curated. Therefore, prioritizing Tammy's specific intent demonstrated through extrinsic evidence, the court will likely rule that Frank inherits both the coins and the medals contained within the album.

3

California has adopted the doctrine of cy pres by statute, allowing a court to modify the terms of a charitable trust if its original purpose becomes impossible, impracticable, unlawful, or wasteful. For cy pres to apply, the court must find that the testator had a general charitable intent, broader than the specific purpose stated. If the intent was solely limited to the narrow purpose which has failed, the trust would fail, and the funds would pass to the testator's heirs or under the residuary clause (though here, this is the residuary clause).

Courts often presume a general charitable intent unless the will clearly indicates otherwise. Tammy dedicated her entire residuary estate to this trust, suggesting a significant commitment to a charitable cause related to RG syndrome and eyesight. While "finding a cure" is specific, it falls under the broader category of combating eye disease and promoting eye health. The absence of a gift-over provision (specifying what happens if the trust purpose fails) further supports the inference of a general charitable intent.

Here, the court must determine if NTC's proposed modification – funding ophthalmology scholarships – aligns with Tammy's general charitable intent and is "as near as possible" to the original purpose. Supporting education in ophthalmology directly relates to eye health and the prevention or treatment of eye diseases like RG syndrome, albeit through a different mechanism (education vs. research for a specific cure). It benefits the same field of medicine and ultimately aids those with vision impairment. This proposed purpose appears to be a suitable and analogous application of the funds within Tammy's likely general charitable intent to combat eye disease.

Therefore, the court is likely to find that Tammy possessed a general charitable intent related to eye health, that the original purpose is impossible, and that NTC's proposed modification is appropriate under the cy pres doctrine. The court will likely grant NTC's petition to change the trust's purpose to establishing ophthalmology scholarships.

(920 words)

1

The analysis begins with Rob's first statement, "Yes, it was me," made in the restaurant. Rob will argue this statement is inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment based on Miranda v. Arizona. He was clearly subjected to a custodial interrogation without the requisite warnings. Officer Otto, uniformed and armed, ordered Rob not to move and to keep his hands visible. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, establishing custody. Officer Otto's direct question about whether Rob was the robber constituted interrogation, as it was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Since Rob was subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, his confession must be suppressed as a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. While the prosecution might suggest this was merely an investigative detention or invoke the public safety exception, the level of restraint indicates custody, and the question asked pertained directly to guilt rather than an immediate safety threat like the gun's specific location, making these counterarguments weak. Therefore, this initial confession is likely inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.

2

Next, we consider Rob's statement at the police station revealing the location of the stolen money. This statement occurred two hours after the initial encounter, following proper Miranda warnings and an affirmative waiver by Rob. Rob will argue this statement should also be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree," tainted by the initial Miranda violation. He might contend that the unwarned confession psychologically compelled the later one, or that the police employed an improper "question first, warn later" tactic.

However, courts generally permits the admission of a statement obtained after proper Miranda warnings and waiver, even if preceded by an unwarned but voluntary statement. Here, there is no indication Rob's initial statement was coerced. Furthermore, the significant time lapse (two hours), the change in location (from restaurant to police station), and the formal administration of Miranda rights serve to attenuate the connection between the initial violation and the subsequent, warned confession. This break in the stream of events distinguishes the situation from the deliberate, continuous interrogation strategy. Thus, Rob's voluntary waiver after receiving proper warnings likely renders his statement about the money admissible.

3

Regarding the gun found in the briefcase, Rob will challenge its admissibility under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Under the Fourth Amendment, he will argue Officer Otto conducted a warrantless search of the briefcase, in which Rob had a reasonable expectation of privacy. He will contend that no warrant exception applied. A search incident to lawful arrest (SILA) might be questionable if the search preceded the formal arrest, or if the briefcase was deemed outside Rob's immediate control once Officer Otto confronted him. Rob might also argue the gun is suppressible as physical fruit derived from the unwarned statement under the Fifth Amendment. The prosecution, however, has compelling counterarguments. The Miranda rule does not require suppression of physical evidence discovered due to a voluntary but unwarned statement. Furthermore, under the Fourth Amendment, the prosecution can argue the gun would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means. This doctrine provides a strong basis for admitting the gun, irrespective of the timing or exact justification for the search at the restaurant.

4

Finally, the admissibility of the stolen money seized from Rob's apartment depends largely on the admissibility of his second statement. Rob will argue that if his statement revealing the money's location is suppressed, then the search warrant based on that statement lacks probable cause, rendering the search unlawful and the money inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. However, as previously discussed, Rob's second statement made at the station after a valid Miranda waiver is likely admissible. Because this statement lawfully provided the probable cause presented in the affidavit, the resulting search warrant was valid. The officers' search of Rob's apartment was conducted pursuant to this valid warrant, conforming to Fourth Amendment requirements. Therefore, the stolen money seized during this lawful search is almost certainly admissible. The connection to the initial unwarned statement is sufficiently attenuated by the subsequent valid waiver and the intervening judicial authorization of the warrant.

In conclusion, while Rob is likely to succeed in suppressing his initial statement "Yes, it was me" due to a Miranda violation, his subsequent statement about the money, the gun found in the briefcase, and the stolen money recovered from his apartment are all likely to be deemed admissible against him at trial.

(765 words)

在袁律师组织下，新生代的学员分别在4月18日和4月24日于上海领事馆进行了两次美签团签。袁律师给所有人开具了推荐信。从结果看，通过率比自行去签证要稍高一些（大于80%），尤其是24日的团，通过了许多白本和有拒签记录的团员。但也有一些学员被拒签，集中在：

• 福建户籍

• 白本

• DS-160填表瑕疵，本次因为人数过多，我们无法一一审核学员的DS-160表格，只是尽可能提供了填表指南和答疑

• 有过拒签记录，且本次出境理由和上次不符的

我们积累了宝贵的美签团签经验，并预计会在下半年在广州再举办一次团签。欢迎大家届时报名参加。建议被拒签的学员提前去周边国家刷刷旅游记录。

鉴于今年7月加州很大可能换成线下考试，新生代USBAR计划在2025年4-5月在上海组织美国签证B1/B2团签。我们建议预计过签率不高的申请人可以跟团走，但过签率本就很高的申请人（去过美国、有香港身份证、有第三国永居、旅行历史丰富）没有必要参团，可以就近自行预约办理。

我们辅导学员美签填表、预约、面谈，不额外收费。希望参团的学员请在3月16日24点之前将名字报给助手。DS-160表可以后填写。还没有注册加州考试资格（registration application）的申请人要尽快寄出无处分证明，争取在面谈之前收到通知邮件并打印。暂时还不需要（现在也没开放）报名考试。

下面这段话来自稍早的文章《新生代SQE开课啦》

我自己只兼职准备了一个月，但我有信心能通过今年1月的考试。如果没有能通过，也绝对不是说我就没有水平教这个课，而是因为我准备的时间实在太短。

刚才7点出成绩，SQE1通过了，分数还不算低。和我一起考的助理林律师也过了。这进一步说明不仅我有水平来教这个课，我们团队的整体水平也是到位的。

去年在各城市开交流会，很多学员提到了SQE，还有一些学员在学习一段时间后深感USBAR的困难，于是我总在琢磨如何做可以不辜负学员。在努力完善USBAR教学方案的同时，就有了开设SQE课程这个计划。助理林律师也很支持（她也是我USBAR的第一批学员）。可以说，没有USBAR的学员，就不会有新生代SQE的平台。

12月初从美国回来，开完杭州和深圳两场交流会后，断断续续学了一个月左右，分别在1月15日和1月23日参加了FLK1和FLK2. 林律师比我学习的时间长点，但她琐事也很多，整体复习时间应该是差不多的。今天好几个学员提醒我说要出成绩了，还有很多学员在不知道我是否通过的情况下就陆续报课，非常感动，就不一一感谢了。

这篇文章并不是鼓励大家无脑来报课，或许SQE1很容易，SQE2豁免也容易，但始终记得雅思7.5是绕不过去的。PTE可能比雅思容易一些（我打算立刻报名去裸考试试，这次真的不见得过了），但也不见得容易太多。所以，这篇主要还是提醒大家，报课不要冲动。

但如果你愿意报课，我当然是倾囊相授我的学习方法，助大家一次通过这个还算比较简单的考试。最近写讲义发现的确有很多没学明白，但依然没有影响我较高分通过考试。所以，今年备课我并不会精益求精，而是希望教会大家如何能像我一样不花太多时间就用巧劲通过这个考试。

我已经建好了新生代SQE的网站和sqeinfo这个微信公众号。

文末附上我的详细成绩单。

近日，我们联系到了UWORLD销售部门，要到了UWORLDQBANK15和UWORLDEP10两个优惠码，分别用于2025年7月的（现在用到7月底）和2026年2月的早鸟套餐（现在用到明年2月底），折后分别是356.15美元和476.10美元。一年的套餐似乎可以重置一次重新刷题。

我从做培训到现在2年左右的时间多次提到无论怎样强调UWORLD的作用都不为过，现在我依然坚持这个观点。在2月考完之后，我已经对Kaplan的出题风格有了全面的了解，并已经在细微之处根据Kaplan的观点修改了教材。加州考生目前的建议同样是刷UWORLD. 经常刷UWORLD的同学会知道今年2月加州是偏简单的。至于Kaplan的网站自编题和紫皮书，我会在学员群里更加具体的建议。

7月考试之前我会安排和今年2月风格非常接近的模拟题和知识点。

我没有收UWORLD的推广费用。事实上这两个优惠码要的还有点颇费周折。

UWORLD包含了NCBE官方放出来的几乎所有真题，其中以2017年的210个分科目的题和2021年的200个不分科的模拟题为代表（210个题散落在1800个题左右的QBank中，200个题在单独的菜单栏Assessment里），也包含了更早的OPE（Online Practice Exam）1-4，或者说OPE 860. 但其中不乏有一些有争议的题目，请参考NCBE和UWorld中的错题（一）、NCBE和UWorld中的错题（二）、NCBE和UWorld中的错题（三）和NCBE和UWorld中的错题（四）。

我们今天看到Donna Hershkowitz, Chief of Admissions/Legislative Director写给加州律协Board of Trustees的一封信，将会在3月5日的董事会上建议退回到线下考试，我想我最担心的事情发生了，这也是为什么在推迟7月报名的时候我第一时间就感到不妙，并持续关注此事。

好在现在还有补救机会，我们看到的程序是，Donna希望这次董事会原则上同意此事，并在3月14日的考试委员会上继续讨论此事，随后（大概在4月）又回到董事会，或者寻求合同委员会寻求批准合同。所以，这次董事会的意见就非常重要。

现在我们可以做的事情包括：

1. 直接写信给Donna，她的邮箱在加州律协官网可以查到；

2. 写信给董事会秘书，[secretariat@calbar.ca.gov](mailto: secretariat@calbar.ca.gov)；

3. 参与3月5日的董事会，Zoom参与链接在https://calbar.zoom.us/j/83006962134，每个人大概有3分钟发言的机会。人在加州也可以线下参加，地点包括

180 Howard Street,San Francisco, CA 94105
1215 Truxtun Avenue, 4th Floor, Bakersfield, CA 93301
888 Brannan Street, San Francisco, CA 94103
39 Waterline Pl, Richmond, CA 94801
501 W Broadway, Suite 900, San Diego, CA 92101
21515 Hawthorne Boulevard,Torrance,CA 90503
931 10th Street,Modesto,CA 95354
1690 W. Shaw Avenue, Fresno, CA 93711
1414 K Street, Sacramento, CA 95814
10000 Washington Boulevard, Culver City, CA 90232
255 North Forbes Street, Lakeport,CA 954530

时间是加州3月5日下午2点，国内3月6日早上6点，鉴于3.2议程开始的不会那么早（甚至有可能拖到第二天），不必那么早起床。

希望发言的可以提前在这个网站注册：https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdLaUdpKFVcSYdOyUalHv_-6ky5pBvbhbEqbMG5hhBqOeOGXw/viewform

如何发言可以参考这个视频：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZ67o8poJLI&t=3300s

议程是 3.2 Discussion and, if Appropriate, Approval of Supplemental Contract Amount for ProctorU, Inc, dba Meazure Learning for Live, Remote Proctoring and Test Center Services (Bar Exam, First-Year Law Students’ Exam, and Legal Specialization Exam Administrations) in 2025 and Discussion and, if Appropriate, Approval of Alternative Vendor for Live, Remote Proctoring and Test Center Services for Administration in 2025 (Bar Exam, First-Year Law Students'Exam, and Legal Specialization Exam Administratioins)

要求开放7月远程考试选项的理由包括

1. 最高法院批准的是远程/线下考试，改成纯线下考试需要加州最高法院的再次批准；

2. 许多人因为改成远程考试，但无法负担去加州的费用，或者因为工作等原因，已经提前花费了不少精力准备这个考试，包括参加可以加分的phase one，改成线下对这部分人有不公平的影响；

3. 许多人退出2月考试是基于对7月继续在线考试的信赖；

4. 线下方案可能都已经来不及让原定于7月底的考试顺利进行，包括租赁场地、开发新的软件等。

你还可以自己想一些和自己情况相结合的理由。