洛杉矶：11月25日15:00-18:00，Starbucks，3584 S Figueroa St, Los Angeles, CA 90007
伯克利：请在11月28日14:00-14:30之间过来，结束时间根据来的人数和话题待定，地址：Caffè Strada，2300 College Ave, Berkeley, CA 94704
方式： 纯聊天，随时来，随时走。不收费、不需要预约。
因为国际旅行的不确定性，来之前还是先在群里看看是否取消。
来的人送饮品一杯和UBE考试会用到的黑色鼠标垫一张（送完为止）。
请不要带礼物给袁律师，不方便带走。
今年7月纽约没有发战报。还是老问题，考纽约的学员（LLM）太少了。通过率和往年也没什么太大区别。纽约出成绩那几天发现完全不买课光看网站的粉丝越来越多，加微信说就看开源教材通过并表达感谢的粉丝就有十几个，以至于销售要求我必须闭源一些教材。闭源不是我的本心，但学员越来越多，不得不有了团队，而一个团队的人要吃饭，也就身不由己起来。
加州出成绩当天则着实带给我了惊喜，考前我留意的大多数人都通过了，还有一些不觉得能过的也过了（你们会在这篇公众号的下方看到他的文章）。今年7月我的学员中通过加州的有25-30人，数倍于去年。本来我感觉通过率似乎超过50%，过了几天才发现原来很多没有通过的人不会第一时间说话，甚至根本就不说话。最后统计了下，学员中通过加州的比例在40%左右，只比以往略高，这才意识到自己原来已经有这么多学员了。
但我有理由相信明年7月会达到一个新高，因为我培训技术在持续增长（而且，增长的不慢），学员也越来越卷。最后只要再小小地降个up to 80分就可以了（狗头）。我都无法想象如果今年就可以降80分我能有多快乐（9号早上帮一个学员查成绩，比给我自己查还紧张）。
但是我还是想说一下加州论文乱给分的问题。如果我学员通过很少，那我这么抱怨可以说是给自己教不好找的借口，但学员通过人数远超过我的预期，我想我有资格说这个话。今年7月的论文明显有一些压分，往年可以上60甚至65的情况，今年莫名其妙给了55、50甚至45. 有好几个我很看好的学员因此拿到了1350-1390之间的分数。还有一些类似成绩的粉丝在出成绩后报课，我看完论文之后也觉得分给低了。他们这些人都是已经可以通过的水平，如果是去年7月可能甚至不需要降分。而明年降40-80分，如果评分模式不变，那通过考试则是如探囊取物一般。只可惜了额外几个月的心力憔悴和一万多的考试费用。
当然，也有一些论文给了不合理的高分，但最近两年每次出成绩我都会点评论文，今年7月整体给分是偏低的。
可以看出，选择题才是通过cabar的法宝。我想我有好几个批改论文时深感无力的学员，一定是靠着恐怖的选择题正确率通过的。而那几个很可惜的学员，无一不是写作能力尚可，没有时间集中突击选择题，只希望能用平均60分的论文加一个平均的选择题成绩通过。奈何今年7月的给分结构并不利于他们，如果不是对论文有十足的理解，仅仅一个平均或者略高的选择题成绩还不够。
我还想表达一下对明年网考的担忧。虽然网考让考生成本大大降低，但放出的25个题有大概1/3是有争议的，甚至干脆就是错的，质量远远不如NCBE（我已经在B站放出了讲解这25个题的视频）。还有几个题虽然没有错，但考点设置地过于奇怪。这种本应该引以为傲的示范题都如此儿戏，考场上会有多少考生冤死在这种错题上，我已经无法想象。除了题目的质量糟糕，试考的技术问题就更加混乱了。考前测试莫名其妙的检测不通过，考试的时候来自印度的监考人无休止地换人，重启电脑，断线。有的人可以用身份证通过认证，有的人又必须要护照以至于拿到护照的时候已经错过考试。还有考官在监考的时候看电视、睡觉。也有太过负责的考官在考试的时候频繁提醒考生离摄像头过远、过近（这其实很影响考生状态）。要知道这已经是把原本应该一起考试的学生分到了十几个时间分别考试，时间也缩短到了一个半小时。而正式考试是所有人在同一时间，需要至少12个小时的不断连。我真心建议有条件的考生还是选择去加州线下考试才省心（而且我担心Phase Two可能要线下参加）。
最后恭喜今年通过的学员，祝大家在执业的旅途中一帆风顺。出于对实务的抵触，我目前并没有给通过的学员设立宣誓群（我觉得大家还是相忘于江湖比较好），宣誓有关的问题可以直接问我或者助手。
和这篇文章一起推送的是几名通过学员的心得，感谢他们的分享。鉴于每个人的基础不同，参考也只是有限。但我还是要提一下那个UWorld刷三遍并统计通过率的同学。如果你也如此上心地准备这个考试，何愁通不过呢？
华盛顿：11月13日16:00-18:00，The Ministry，601 New Jersey Ave NW, Washington, DC 20001
费城：11月14日13:00-15:00，Starbucks，3401 Walnut St, Philadelphia, PA 19104
纽约：11月15日13:00-15:00，Starbucks，45 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012
波士顿：11月16日13:00-16:00，Starbucks，700 Commonwealth Ave, Boston, MA 02215
方式：纯聊天，没有presentation. 你可以随时来、随时走。不收费、不需要预约。美国交流会人预计不会太多，你愿意来的话，可能就你一个人。交流会主题暂定纽约州（UBE）考试，也可以聊聊加州bar、绿卡和就业等问题。
因为国际旅行的不确定性，来之前还是先在群里看看是否取消。
来的人送饮品一杯和UBE考试会用到的黑色鼠标垫一张（送完为止）。
请不要带礼物给袁律师（美国境内航班一般没有免费托运行李额）。
10月纽约放榜了。我们很开心地陆续收到了很多学员的私信，得知他们顺利通过NY BAR的考试。感谢他们自己的努力和对我们的信任，我们非常荣幸能陪伴他们这一路并见证他们取得成功。
众所周知，不同于加州，要成为纽约州的律师，除了报名参加考试的资格要求更加严苛外，要想走到宣誓这一步，前面还有很多需要闯过的难关。不仅需要通过NY BAR（UBE）和MPRE，还要通过NYLE，并且还需要完成50小时的Pro Bono公益服务。
是的，现在要想成为纽约州律师，NY BAR（UBE）+MPRE+NYLE+50小时Pro Bono+各类申请材料缺一不可。除非您是美国其他州律师，仅仅是来纽约州pro hac vice。
在递交admission申请前完成即可。但是注意，NY BAR的有效期是三年，如果超过了这个时间，需要重新考试。所以如果可以，请尽快完成吧。
开始的时间，可以从LLM入学时间的前一年就开始Pro bono工作并计入50小时。
可以在美国其他州或其他国家完成50小时的合格工作。所以，在中国境内也可以完成。
50小时的公益工作必须是与法律相关的，需要在申请时详细说明工作的性质和情况。
（提示：完成这些工作时还没有成为执业律师，要避免去做那些必须是有执照的美国执业律师才能做的事情（此刻请回想一下MPRE的考试内容）。但是可以在执业律师的指导下进行法律检索、填写表格等等。）如果是中国律师，那么提供免费法律咨询、无偿代理公益案件，都可以计入这50小时。
所有在符合条件的law schook clinic工作的时间都将被认可，但你用于教学培训的时间不应超过实际使用法律技能的时间。此外，旅行或通勤时间不计入在内。获得学术学分并不会导致计时的失效。
我做的其他工作（如调解/参与问卷调查/填报税单/翻译等）是否可以计入pro bono?
需要看情况。重点是完成这些工作是否是为了帮扶贫困或低收入人群。比如翻译工作，单纯的为贫困或低收入人群提供翻译服务并不能计入（不是law-related），但是如果翻译是您正在做的pro bono的项目的一部分，那么提供口译或翻译服务的事实不会使原本符合条件的工作时间失效（但只有legal service的时间可以计入）。
如果是在美国，法学院通常都会有Pro bono的机会给大家，平时可以关注一下公告栏和及时查收邮箱、各类网站信息。
如果是在国内，可以寻找提供免费提供法律咨询等服务的公益团体。可以联系助理获取相关联系咨询方式。
需要为每个用于满足公益服务要求的项目填写一份表格（Form Affidavit of Compliance），建议在完成每个符合条件的公益工作项目时填写此表格。样表可以参考这里，但建议实际填写时以BOLE发布的最新版本为准。
一份表格是一次工作项目，50小时可以通过几份表格（几个项目）来累计，提交时需要一并提交。
每个表格的第三页都需要该项目的指导律师/法官（在该司法管辖区执业）签字（这个部分不需要公证人签，只需要指导律师签字）。
表格需要找公证机构进行公证（表格第二页需要公证人签字）。
在美国的话，有的法学院会提供免费的公证服务，可以关注。如果没有的话，也可以选择美国当地的公证服务，比如银行，UPS等等，可以就近选择。
如果是在中国国内，目前比较常用的可以找大使馆预约notary服务（申请宣誓成为加州律师的宣誓公证也可以找美国大使馆进行公证）。
最后，祝大家顺利完成Pro bono！
Expectation Damages
Expectation Damages are awarded to put the plaintiff in the position they would have been in if the contract had been performed as expected, without fraud. For the Jaguars baseball, Perry could have received 5,000 on the open market but was misled into selling it for 20, resulting in a loss of 4,980. For the Sluggers baseball, Denise sold it for 10,000 but misled Perry into accepting only 2,000, resulting in an 8,000 loss. Therefore, the total expectation damages amount to $12,980.
Reliance Damages
Reliance Damages compensate for expenses the plaintiff incurred based on the defendant's promise, essentially treating the situation as if the contract had never been made. In this scenario, there is no indication of any reliance expenses incurred by Perry that would justify reliance damages.
Consequential Damages
Consequential Damages damages cover losses caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct that were a foreseeable result of the breach. In this case, the expectation damages adequately compensate Perry for his financial losses, thus obviating the need for consequential damages.
Incidental Damages
Incidental Damages cover additional costs incurred directly because of the breach, such as costs related to sales and advertisements. There is no evidence of incidental damages in this scenario.
Liquidated Damages
Liquidated Damages are pre-agreed damages specified in the contract for breach. There is no mention of such damages in the contract between Perry and Denise.
Punitive Damages
Although contracts generally do not warrant punitive damages, fraud cases like this one might. However, courts typically exercise caution in awarding punitive damages in contract disputes, and more information about state-specific laws and court inclinations would further influence this discussion.
Nominal Damages
Given the significant expectation damages available, Perry has no need to pursue nominal damages, which are symbolic amounts awarded when a legal wrong has occurred without a corresponding loss.
Conclusion
Generally, the damages a plaintiff can claim include either expectation or reliance damages, along with consequential and incidental damages, less any avoidable losses.
Here, Perry is entitled to recover $12,980 in expectation damages, representing the difference between what he received and what he should have received for the baseballs, absent Denise's fraud.
Replevin
Replevin allows the recovery of specific personal property and is available if (1) the defendant is wrongfully withholding personal property, (2) that the plaintiff has a right to possess.
Replevin would allow Perry to recover possession of the Jaguars baseball directly. Since Denise still has the Jaguars baseball, replevin could be a straightforward remedy to address his loss related to that item.
Equitable Lien
An equitable lien is available if a defendant: (1) wrongfully acquired title to property, and (2) would be unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the property.
Perry could seek an equitable lien on the Voy car to secure payment of the $8,000 he was defrauded of in the sale of the Sluggers baseball. However, it would only cover the direct loss amount, not any increased value.
Constructive Trust
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy used to prevent unjust enrichment resulting from wrongful conduct, which in this case, is fraud.
This remedy could be applied to the Voy car, given Denise's fraud in using the proceeds from the Sluggers baseball to purchase the car. A constructive trust would treat Denise as if she were holding the car in trust for Perry, allowing him to claim actual ownership of the vehicle. This is particularly advantageous here due to the car's appreciation in value.
(550-600 words)
这篇我没有看任何法条纯凭联邦民诉的感觉写，所以会有错误，比如加州动议重审是3周不是28天，但我认为这篇500字的论文至少也可以有65分。
In California, a juror can be disqualified for cause if there is a reasonable likelihood that their judgment could be influenced by bias or a financial interest in the outcome of the case.
Juror #5 disclosed that she worked as a Motor engineer before retiring five years ago. While past employment could suggest potential bias (due to possible loyalty or insider knowledge), the substantial lapse of time since her departure may lessen concerns of bias.
Juror #5 also owns 50 shares of Motor stock, constituting 2% of her total financial assets. While owning stock in a party involved in a case can suggest a financial interest in the trial's outcome, the small shareholding (only 2% of her assets) means any financial impact from the litigation outcome might be insignificant.
Crucially, Juror #5 stated that she could be fair and impartial. Courts give weight to a juror's assertion of impartiality unless compelling evidence suggests otherwise. Considering all relevant factors, the court likely did not err in seating Juror #5.
A directed verdict is proper only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact, meaning that even when evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable jury could reach a different conclusion.
Here, the issue of whether the misuse was foreseeable is a factual question for the jury, based on the evidence presented. Moreover, even if Palma could convincingly argue that no reasonable jury could conclude the misuse was unforeseeable, she would still need to demonstrate that no reasonable jury could find the product was not defective. To obtain a directed verdict, Palma must establish that a reasonable jury could only find that the seat was defectively designed and that any misuse was foreseeable. This sets a high bar.
Therefore, addressing only the foreseeability of misuse is insufficient for securing a directed verdict, particularly when the product's defectiveness remains disputed. The court appropriately denied the directed verdict motion, as both issues of defect and foreseeability were rightfully submitted to the jury.
A motion for a new trial must be filed within 28 days after the entry of judgment. Here, Palma filed her motion within 28 days of the jury's verdict, suggesting timeliness.
Palma's motion is partly based on newly discovered evidence in the form of Motor's safety test reports, which indicate severe injuries were likely regardless of seat angle. For this to justify a new trial, Palma must demonstrate that the evidence was not discoverable through reasonable diligence during the original trial. In this case, if Motor intentionally hid these reports, Palma may argue that she could not have obtained them despite reasonable efforts, thus satisfying this requirement. Additionally, Palma needs to show that this evidence is crucial - had this evidence been available during the trial, the outcome would likely have been different. As the evidence appears to demonstrate that misuse was not the cause of the injuries, this evidence could have influenced the jury's decision, and thus was crucial.
Another basis for granting a new trial is evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party. Palma provides evidence that Motor intentionally concealed safety test reports, potentially constituting fraud or misconduct. If the court finds that Motor engaged in such behavior and that it impacted the outcome of the trial, this could warrant a new trial.
(500 words)
昨天刚说根据试考是否抽中决定报2月还是7月，当晚就出了抽签结果。
目前初步统计，只要用正确的方式报名了Phase One，都收到了有资格参加的邮件，中签率100%. 所有选择线上考试的考生都被允许纯线上，选择线下参加Phase One的学员统计数量不足。
没有及时报名的也不用灰心，明年7月可能还会有Phase Two. 而且不参加试考本身并不会降分，考试难度、通过率预计都不会有显著变化。
成功报名Phase One的同学也建议临时抱下佛脚。虽然说心理学评估，但正确率越高肯定加分越多的。
今天加州最高法院通过了律协的方案，即未来的加州法考将采取线上（和/或）线下考试中心的方案。加州同时通过了第一次试考（Phase One）的方案，但不带偏见地驳回了明年7月底举办的第二次试考（Phase Two）的方案。法院要求加州在第一次试考结束后进行评估，根据届时的情况如有必要再上报Phase Two。
下面回答几个群里问的非常多的几个问题。
Phase One是否可以同时给2月和7月加分？
不可以。Phase One只能给明年参加的第一次考试（first attempt）加分。所以袁律师一再建议考7月的，不仅因为7月惯例通过率就比2月高、7月我们对题型更加熟悉，最主要是因为7月有可能史无前例降两次最多80分。如果参加2月，就失去了7月（可能的）额外降最多40分的机会。虽然本次驳回了Phase Two，但你们也看到了只要State Bar想做什么，法院的程序性驳回基本只是刷存在感而已。
如果没有抽中Phase One，也不在乎1700刀的话，的确可以报名2月考试，但完全可以等抽签名单出来之后再决定。抽签名单肯定会在11月8日试考之前出来，如果拖到11月再报名法考，顶多也就是50美元的罚金。
是否可以确定完全线上考试？
我们认为是的。
虽然加州一再强调不保证考生选择线上/考试中心的方案会得到尊重，但线上几乎没有成本，而线下反而需要考试中心有足够的位子（就算有，也是一笔开销），所以顶多是不会尊重选择考试中心的学员。
我们现在可以接受只能参加网考的学员参加课程。如果网考的选择没有得到尊重（可能性很小），我们可以全额退款。
那这样是否认为可以不用办美国签证？
是的。参加加州法考不需要签证。参加MPRE可以报名塞班岛的考位（我们会在学员群里提醒考位的开放），同样不需要美国签证。职业道德审查、宣誓都不需要前往美国。
但是，如果被美国拒签过，在通过美签之前就不可以去塞班了。建议美签通过率存疑的学员至少等去塞班考过MPRE再尝试美签。
考试题型是否有变化？
没有。但选择题换出题机构肯定会有风格上的变化，可以通过刷Kaplan自编的模拟题进行熟悉。
论文目前还没有换出题机构，风格不会变化（但2026年之后可能会换成Kaplan）。
明年7月和未来是否依然网考？
在可预见的未来会继续网考。但考试的题型可能会有变化。
是否可以选择在美国以外的地方，比如中国大陆、中国香港参加线下考试？
我们认为不行。这样有透题风险。也不能指望考试中心深夜上班。
即使网考，也只能提前3-5天在国内倒时差、深夜考试。虽然省去了长途奔波的费用，但历史经验表明这个也挺折腾的，最好在国内订酒店。
Contingency agreements in tort cases are generally permissible, but they must be provided in a written contract that clearly outlines the fee structure. Furthermore, the ABA requires that fees be reasonable, and California stipulates that fees must not "shock the conscience." Although we don't know the specific contingency percentage, attorney fees take into account numerous factors. Generally speaking, a lawyer's fee constituting up to 30% of the total settlement is considered reasonable. Here, there is a valid contingency fee agreement, so there is no issue of professional misconduct.
When August sent a written settlement demand for $500,000 to Len and learned that Len had not communicated it to Davis, August did nothing. This is the first potential ethical issue. The duty of diligence requires a lawyer to zealously represent clients and take actions to secure their interests, and the duty to report requires reporting possible ethical violations by the opposing party, e. g. failing to inform the client of a settlement offer. However, Len's inaction may not necessarily be unethical if there is a possible arrangement between the opposing client and lawyer that demands above a certain amount need not be disclosed to the client. If such an understanding exists, not informing the client might be ethically permissible. From August's perspective, he cannot directly communicate with the opposing client (which will be discussed infra). He can not question Len about not informing their client either, as this could be protected by the opposing lawyer's duty of confidentiality. Since August did not have many better options due to Len's inaction, we do not have enough information to definitively determine if August's inaction constitutes ethical misconduct. Of course, as a general practice, making a phone call to ensure that Len received and understood the demand letter might be more appropriate.
Next, August instructing his own client to communicate with the opposing party is another problematic issue. Ethical standards clearly prohibit direct client-to-opposing client communication without the opposing lawyer's consent, as this is designed to prevent lawyers from using their legal knowledge to create an unequal communication advantage. However, client-to-client communication does not have this issue - even if such communication is instigated by a lawyer. Therefore, instigating a client to directly communicate with the opposing client does not violate ethical standards. Nevertheless, if a lawyer has their client deliver their signed demand letter to the opposing client, this could potentially breach the duty of fairness to the opposing party.
The ABA allows fee sharing between lawyers provided that the division is proportional to the work performed or risk assumed. California does not even require proportionality. The rules also mandates that fee sharing must not increase the total fee charged to the client. Here, it appears that August and Rita shared both work and risk, and the overall fee for the client did not increase.
The most apparent problem with August and Rita's arrangement is the lack of prior client consent for such a fee-sharing agreement. The ABA requires "informed consent, confirmed in writing" for changes in fee-sharing arrangements, while California requires "informed written consent." By not obtaining the client's prior consent, August and Rita violated their duty of communication with the client.
Rita's statement that she "knew" Dani raises potential conflict of interest concerns. Whether this acquaintance is due to a familial connection, fiduciary duty, or a prior attorney-client relationship, each could impair Rita’s ability to represent Paul effectively and may cast doubt on the legitimacy of the settlement agreement.
Rita settled the case without obtaining Paul’s consent at the time of settlement. Although the settlement amount of $500,000 was previously agreed upon by Paul, seeking Paul’s confirmation would have been a more appropriate and cautious practice.
From Len's perspective, there was no agreement with Davis to disregard demands above a certain amount. Therefore, failing to communicate the $500,000 settlement demand to the client constitutes a violation of his duty of communication.
The attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary one based on independent contract principles where the client is responsible for decisions regarding objectives, and the attorney is responsible for means and manners. While an attorney does not need to consult the client on every strategic decision, significant matters must be communicated to the client for them to make informed decisions. The settlement amount is a crucial aspect of a civil case, and no matter how unreasonable the attorney might perceive an offer, it must be communicated to the client to allow them to decide independently. Therefore, Len’s ethical duty would have been to inform Davis of the settlement demand.
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Executory Interest
Under the terms of Olivia's conveyance of Lot B to Barry, the clause states: "If at any time, Barry, his heirs, successors or assigns shall use the premises for any purpose other than as a personal residence, said Lot B shall immediately vest in fee simple in Zach or his surviving descendants." This language gives Barry a fee simple determinable, while granting Zach an executory interest. This means that if the land is used for anything other than a personal residence, the ownership automatically transfers to Zach. After Zach's death, his granddaughter, as his surviving descendant, inherits this executory interest, assuming that this jurisdiction has abolished the common law Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP).
Rule Against Perpetuities
According to the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP), a future interest must vest, if at all, no later than 21 years after the death of a relevant life at the time the interest was created. In this case, the executory interest that Zach holds could potentially violate the RAP because the condition - using Lot B for "any purpose other than as a personal residence" - might occur beyond 21 years after the death of Zach or any other relevant person who was alive at the time of the interest's creation. Therefore, Zach's executory interest might be invalid under the RAP.
If the executory interest is deemed invalid due to the RAP, the executory interest would be replaced by Oliver’s reversionary interest, as reversions are not subject to the RAP. This means that if the condition is breached, the property would revert back to Oliver's estate (or her successors) rather than vesting in Zach's descendants.
Wait and See Rule
Few jurisdictions directly abolish the RAP; instead, many adopt the "wait and see" rule. This rule assesses whether the interest actually vests within the period defined by the RAP—21 years after the death of a relevant life in being. Although Zach passed away 60 years ago, Barry is still alive. Therefore, under this jurisdiction's specific "wait and see" rule, it is possible that the executory interest does not violate the RAP, as Barry's continued survival means the vesting period might still fall within allowable limits.
In summary, if the RAP remains unmodified in the jurisdiction, Darla may have nothing, and Lot B goes to Simon. If the jurisdiction has abolished the RAP or adopted a "wait and see" rule, Darla might have held an executory interest in Lot B before Developer began constructing an office building. Once the condition was breached by the non-residential use, her interest converted into a fee simple. This fee simple, however, is subject to Simon's easement, which will be discussed later.
Easement by Implication
An easement by implication is established when: (1) A single tract of land is divided by a common owner; (2) There is a preexisting use by the grantor benefiting the land prior to the division; and (3) The use is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant parcel. The existing Use must be apparent and continuous at the time the tract is divided.
Here, Olivia originally owned both Lot A and Lot B, fulfilling the single tract division requirement. The dirt road existed and was apparent and visible before the division, constituting a preexisting use benefiting Lot A. The road is necessary for Simon's access to the highway, as no alternative exists without significant expense. Simon likely has an easement by implication over the dirt road on Lot B.
Easement by Necessity
An easement by necessity is established when: (1) A single tract of land is divided by a common owner; and (2) The access provided by the easement is absolutely necessary for the use of the property. That easement terminates when the necessity ceases.
In this case, by dividing the original tract and conveying Lot B to Barry, Olivia inadvertently deprived Lot A of direct access to the public highway. This division creates an absolute necessity because there was no other access to the highway. An easement by necessity would be created and remain unless and until an alternative means of access is established.
Easement by Prescription
Even if an easement by implication or by necessity was not created when the land was divided, Simon can still acquire an easement by prescription. An easement by prescription is established when the possessor’s use of the land is: (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous; (3) hostile; and (4) for the statutory period, which is typically between 7 to 20 years.
Here, Simon has regularly used the dirt road for 30 years, satisfying the open, continuous and the statutory duration requirements. If he did not originally acquire an easement by implication or necessity, then his use of the land was without Barry's permission, meeting the requirement of hostility. Therefore, Simon can claim an easement by prescription over the dirt road on Lot B.
Merger
In conclusion, Simon has obtained an easement over the dirt road by implication, necessity, or at least by prescription. This easement remains intact regardless of the sale of Lot B to Developer or if transferred to Darla through her executory interest. However, if the Rule Against Perpetuities applies and causes the executory interest to fail, resulting in a reversion to Olivia's estate and thereby uniting ownership of both Lot A and Lot B in Simon, the easement would merge and thus be extinguished.
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