跳到主要内容

· 阅读需 8 分钟

考试季7天洛杉矶之行随着USC交流会的结束告一段落。第一天我在Pasadena,第二天在Ontario,上午我和大家一起排队,中午在考场门口提供午餐、咖啡和水果。考前两天还在Ontario附近带学员去购物和送了一些文具。相信大部分学员并不缺这些,顶多算是一些心理支持,以及既然袁律师来了,电脑遇到任何问题都可以解决。我是第一次去现场,获得了很多关于考场环境的一手资料,明年如果还是线下的话,想必可以更好的服务学员,比如建议Ontario考场的学员一定要多穿衣服,最好穿羽绒服。

考场收获最大的就是关于教研重要性体会。前期刷UWORLD已经是所有人的共识(有一些非学员仅仅因为我不断强调UWORLD的重要性就来感谢我),但最后两个月最重要的复习季应该干什么则是我在免费课里没有说的。而且,每个学员的水平不一样,给出的建议自然也不尽相同。NCBE最新的200题已经是将近5年前放出的(而且这200题偏难怪,和考场上知识点重合度不高),在此之后UWORLD几乎没有什么变化。再上一批的210题就要追溯的2017年(这次反而契合度很高)。随着时间的推移,考场上的热点已经不再是UWORLD这些机构能掌握的了——大型培训机构比如Barbri或许可以掌握,但他们本来就并不十分应试,更不屑于在课堂上一再强调所谓近期的热点。所以真正能给华人律师给出相对准确的热点的,也就只剩那么两家机构。所以我最近看到突然有一些新人想进入来卷这个行业——实在是没有必要,第一是你很难卷过我,好好干律师比干我这行赚多了,第二是如果你刚进入这个行业,根本不知道考场上喜欢考什么,如果真的收到了学员,我是捏把汗的。 对论文来说,我一直的观点是短期内无法快速提升,考前只需要2-3周时间准备。大部分备考的学员发了论文来改,我对每个人会提出具体的建议。目前我发现PT有必要单独介绍一些重点,加上现在我已经对过去几年的PT如数家珍(改论文改出来的熟练),所以我会在下一阶段考虑PT的教研。至于小论文,合作机构SmartBarPrep的材料已经很好。我给一个JD学员介绍国内律师备考的方法是背rules而不是用自己的话陈述rules直接给他惊呆了。我不反对背rules或许有唬住考官的奇效,但那太痛苦了。

对选择题来说,除了那25个测试题,答案只有对或者错,不存在模棱两可。考前答疑群里一定要把所有提出的问题彻底辩明白。除非的确是实务上存在争议并不会出现在题目中的知识,否则任何人答错了——包括我在内——必须被纠正,不留模糊的空间。考场上遇到了就一定要选中正确答案,这是选择题教研的核心。 所以考出来,Reddit等论坛老外对题目叫苦不迭,而我的学员并没有太大意外。完全出乎意料的知识点有没有?不可避免的有,但很少。大部分考场上遇到但UWORLD里面没有或一笔带过的知识点在考前一个月内被非常科学的教研手段弥补了。最终大家都是带着几乎完备也没有错误的知识体系上考场。所以,即使还要等3个月才出分,我已经可以断言11月学员们会带来喜人的成绩。

我今年花了2个月时间就单单准备考前的教研,而不是去更新已经比较老的精讲视频,现在看来时间花的非常值。当然,我会更新那些老视频,但那并不是我课程的重点——虽然学员付费后第一时间收到的是教材和视频课,但那只是你的课费买到的相对不重要的东西。教研才是我课程的竞争力。作为北师大的学子,我本科和硕士相当一部分课程是学习如何把人教懂,相信不会有人在这方面轻易领先我。答疑和批改论文本来也是核心竞争力,但现在有了AI,大部分时候比我自己答疑和批改要详细和耐心,我的角色目前只是调教AI、输入学生的问题,以及检查AI回答的正确性了(或许很快连这都不需要了)。现阶段,和AI的配合或许算是我的核心竞争力之一吧。 所以,这也是为什么我这次一定要去洛杉矶的原因,为考生服务固然重要,但更重要的是在考后coffee chat的只言片语中记录和思考明年的教研。

(如果明年换Kaplan出题,请不用担心,没有人比我更懂Kaplan的教研,虽然他们自己的示范题都一堆错误着实让人捏把汗)

· 阅读需 2 分钟

7.26 Oakland交流会

时间:7月26日 13:00 - 16:00

地点:星巴克,200 Broadway Ste 4, Oakland, CA 94607

7.28 Anaheim交流会

时间:7月28日 13:00 - 16:00

地点:星巴克,1800 S Harbor Blvd Ste 101, Anaheim, CA 92802

上述两场不会分享和考试本身(考题)有关的信息,可以解决技术问题和领一些文具。请大家以在酒店复习为主。饮品仅限蒸汽奶或热巧克力。

7.29(考试day 1) Pasadena现场考务

早上和中午,Pasadena门口给大家提供帮助(学员优先)

7.30(考试day 2) Ontario现场考务

早上和中午,Ontario门口给大家提供帮助(学员优先)

7.30 Ontario交流会

时间:7月30日 17:30 - 随缘结束(营业时间到24点) 建议吃完晚饭过来

地点:星巴克,111 N Vineyard Ave Ontario, CA 91764

7.31 Pasadena交流会

时间:7月31日 9:00 - 随缘结束 但不会持续到午饭

地点:星巴克,300 E Colorado Blvd, Pasadena, CA 91101, USA

8.1 USC交流会

时间:8月1日 13:00 - 16:00

地点:星巴克,3584 S Figueroa St, Los Angeles, CA 90007

Q & A

Q:学员和非学员都可以来吗?

A: 都欢迎。但文具优先供应给学员。

Q:不在交流会期间需要技术支持,如何联系?

A: 请联系助手号。学员可以在群里呼叫袁律师。

Q:会不会有考过的学员前来分享经验?

A: 欢迎即将考过的你前来分享经验。

· 阅读需 6 分钟

加州

这次加州通过率确实很高。我的学员通过率在75%左右,这比加州整体的55%还要高出不少。往年我的学员通过率通常介于外国律师通过率和整体通过率(包括JD)之间,这次算是一个突破。中国地区考生这次表现也确实亮眼,有学员查了留中国地址通过的有98人,这还不包括那些留美国地址的华人LLM。

但对于这种高通过率,我想强调调分是主要因素。我教的好不好,大家自有公论,但和2月这次的通过率峰值没有绝对的直接关联。我教的再好,今年7月通过率也不大可能超过50%。所以,2月这次机会,抓住了就是幸运,没抓住也不必过于纠结,应尽快调整心态,着眼未来。

通过的关键是什么?还是选择题。和我沟通的未通过学员,多数是UWorld一遍都没完成,少数是刷完一遍但投入不够。当然,也有极个别刷了两遍UWorld仍未通过的情况,这可能涉及到刷题,但属于绝对少数。

不刷UWorld能不能通过?理论上可行,尤其2月份只要论文表现尚可也能通过。但对多数中国考生而言,单纯依靠论文通过考试,难度不小。我的学员中,论文突出让我觉得选择题可以不怎么学的有,但人数不多,而且基本都是JD。所以,想稳定通过,还是要靠选择题。这次2月未通过的成绩单,论文固然有不足,但选择题的表现是决定性的。

点击查看加州2月论文点评

纽约

纽约方面,学员通过率略少于一半。此外还有两到三成的学员分数在260-266这个区间,加上这部分学员通过率就很可观了。对于这部分学员,我们一直在探讨用这个分数去申请那些接受260分标准的州的执照,毕竟NY的华人律师数量远超这些州,这意味着即便拿到了NY Bar,后续的职业发展路径可能会更拥挤。因此,对于部分考生而言,与其在NY这座“独木桥”上竞争,不如考虑用一个尚可的成绩,去一个执业压力相对较小的州,过几年如果确有需要,可以考虑transfer到DC或WA等大州,不失为一种更具性价比的选择。

让我比较欣慰的是,LLM学员的数量有所增加,虽然在LLM群体中选择我的课目前仍然是少数,但是个积极的信号。恳请各位LLM学员务必在班上多多宣传。

关于备考和未来的一些看法

选择题是核心:这一点我反复强调。无论是加州还是纽约,这本质上是一个选择题决定结果的考试。选择题分数够高,通过的确定性就大得多。

论文的投入回报:我目前也在尝试AI辅助批改论文,希望能提高效率。但实话实说,考前一两个月集中攻克论文,分数提升的上限通常在40-50分。而选择题,如果方法得当,短期内提升100多分并非不可能。所以,备考后期,主要精力还是应该放在选择题的错题整理和知识点巩固上。论文可以每天分配少量时间练习,掌握基本技巧即可。

经验贴的参考价值:今年2月加州通过的经验,参考性可能有限,核心就是UWorld刷透。很多学员写了经验分享,我没有发在公众号,部分原因也是不想在平台过多提及或比较友商。他们大多在小红书有分享,大家可以自行搜索。

考试趋势展望:今年7月是NCBE命题。明年加州若回归Kaplan,大家也不必担心。我对Kaplan的真题体系比较熟悉,甚至超过NCBE。Kaplan的模拟题可能风格独特,但真题相对会常规且简单一些。核心还是掌握好选择题。

再次恭喜2月通过的学员。

· 阅读需 6 分钟

从今年2月网考搞砸了以来,如果加州每出一个新闻我都写一篇文章,那整个公众号将会被海量加州信息覆盖。随着上周五Board of Trustee关于考后救济审议结束,我终于可以把大家比较关心的问题一次性总结出来。过几天我再写一篇2月加州战报(提前预告下,我们的通过率非常高,通过人数也非常多),这事儿就算翻篇了,咱们还是要向前看,不能一直被困在2月考试中。

7月换回NCBE

加州确定今年7月换回了NCBE的题目,也就是今年7月加州和纽约的考题会一样,大概率也不存在什么用电脑做选择题了(NCBE似乎要求必须纸质题、纸质回答)。

至于题目风格,其实我更喜欢求变一些,因为今年2月过后其实我更了解Kaplan了。同样喜欢求变的考生也不用担心,和Kaplan的合同还没有结束,明年2月和之后的考试有望又换回Kaplan.

临时资格

理事会批准向加州最高法院提交以下针对2025年2月加州律师资格考试未通过者或退考考生的补救计划:

  1. 《规则9.49》临时执业计划的扩展与延期(该计划允许法学院毕业生在持牌律师监督下开展法律执业。参与者仍需通过律师考试并满足其他准入要求才能获得正式执照。)

    a. 该计划修订后适用于两类人群:未通过2025年2月加州律师资格考试的考生,以及在考试前退考的考生。

    b. 计划有效期延长至实施后两年或2027年12月31日(以较晚者为准)。此截止日期适用于现有计划参与者及新增群体。

    c. 加州律师协会可向参与者收取合理申请费,用于覆盖计划实施及管理成本。

  2. 美国执业律师特许准入通道

    a. 若《商业与职业法典》第6062条修订后允许美国执业律师免试获取加州执业资格,律师协会应制定"宣誓准入admission on motion"程序,适用于美国其他司法辖区持照且无不良记录的律师。(以AB 1522法案通过为前提,法案授权CBE为执业满4年的外州律师制定免试准入方案,未满4年者需参加差异化考核。)

    b. 过渡期内,律师协会应为符合以下条件的律师制定并实施快速特许准入程序:其他美国司法辖区持照且无不良记录,并曾参加或退出2025年2月加州律师资格考试者。

关于重新评估2月考生诉求

包括:

  • 取两轮阅卷较高分而非平均分
  • 为接近及格线考生设立申诉机制
  • 允许仅重考2025年7月实务测试(PT)并替换2月成绩(中国考生不要轻易尝试这个)
  • 核查考生反映的答案错配、考试便利措施被拒等问题

费用豁免政策

Board of Trustee审议并通过了考试委员会关于费用豁免的提议。具体包括如下内容:

  1. 批准将2月会议通过的2025年7月律师资格考试费用豁免政策扩展适用范围,即支持以下三个考试中最早参加的场次——2025年2月律师资格考试的退考考生或未通过该次考试的考生首次报考的场次:2025年7月、2026年2月或2026年7月;
  2. 允许已使用费用豁免来申请2025年7月律师资格考试的考生退考,并将该费用豁免转用于2026年任一场次的律师资格考试。

试考出分和加分延期政策

去年11月试考结果发送给参加试考的考生。

拟向最高法院提议,试考除了可以给2025年7月加20分,也可以转用于2026年任一场次的律师资格考试。但依然只能调分一次,2月调过的7月就不能再调了。

· 阅读需 4 分钟

Duty of Confidentiality

Larry accepted payment from Carla's mother (M) on the condition that M be informed of all aspects of the divorce, including Carla's confidential statements to Larry. This information is protected under the duty of confidentiality. Sharing such information requires the client's informed consent, which is advisable to confirm in writing (and often required under California rules for waivers). Agreeing to M's demand, especially without C's valid informed consent, would compel Larry to reveal confidential information obtained during the representation. Larry likely violated his duty of confidentiality by agreeing to the mother's condition for payment without proper client consent.

Duty Regarding Third-Party Payment

Lawyers must not accept payment from a third party unless the client gives informed consent (which must be informed written consent in CA), there is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment or the client-lawyer relationship, and client confidentiality is maintained. M's condition directly links payment to the disclosure of confidential information and potentially interferes with L's independent judgment by creating an obligation to the payer. Accepting payment under these conditions without meeting all requirements, especially regarding informed written consent and non-interference, constitutes an ethical breach. Larry likely violated the rules governing acceptance of payment from a third party.

Duty Regarding Termination and Scope of Representation

Larry sent Carla a disengagement letter after the divorce but simultaneously offered future assistance on related matters and kept her file open. He later provided ongoing legal advice on new issues (tax, support, visitation). This created ambiguity about whether the attorney-client relationship truly ended or continued, at least for post-divorce matters. An attorney has a duty to clearly communicate the status and scope of representation. Failing to definitively terminate the relationship, especially while continuing to provide legal advice, makes it likely Carla remained a current client for some purposes. Larry likely violated his duty to clearly define the scope and status of the attorney-client relationship.

Duty Regarding Sexual Relationships with Clients

Larry entered into a consensual sexual relationship with Carla after her divorce was final. Both ABA and California rules strictly regulate or prohibit sexual relationships between lawyers and current clients. Given the ambiguity regarding termination and Larry's ongoing legal advice, Carla could reasonably be considered a current client when the sexual relationship began. If so, Larry violated ABA rules. The relationship also creates significant risks under California rules, particularly regarding potential undue influence given Carla's dependency and the potential impact on Larry's professional judgment. Larry likely violated ethical rules by entering into a sexual relationship with someone who was arguably still a current client.

Duty of Competence

Larry, primarily a divorce lawyer, provided ongoing advice to Carla on tax, child support, and visitation matters. A lawyer must provide competent representation, possessing the necessary legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. If Larry lacked expertise in tax law, providing advice in that area without becoming competent or associating with a competent lawyer constitutes a breach of this duty. Larry likely violated his duty of competence by providing advice in areas outside his primary expertise, such as tax law.

Duty Regarding Business Transactions with Clients

Larry entered into a partnership agreement with Carla, wherein he provided capital and she ran the business. This constitutes a business transaction with a client (likely current, given ongoing advice and relationship). Such transactions require strict compliance with ethical rules: terms must be fair, fully disclosed in writing; the client must be advised in writing to seek independent legal counsel and given the chance to do so; and the client must give informed written consent to the terms and the lawyer's role. Larry drafted the agreement, suggested Carla could have her mother (not independent counsel) review it (not in writing), and obtained Carla's signature based on trust. This fails to meet the requirements for written disclosure, written advice to seek independent counsel, and properly documented informed written consent. Larry clearly violated the strict rules governing business transactions with a client.

Duty of Loyalty (Conflicts of Interest)

Larry's personal, sexual, and business relationships with Carla created significant conflicts of interest. His personal interests (romantic and financial) could materially limit his ability to exercise independent professional judgment when advising Carla, whether on the partnership or other legal matters. He failed to obtain the necessary informed written consent to proceed despite these conflicts (required if the conflict is consentable, which is questionable here given the multiple intertwined personal and financial interests). Larry likely violated his duty of loyalty by engaging in relationships and transactions that created conflicts of interest without proper client disclosure and consent.

(750 words)

· 阅读需 5 分钟

1

Governing Law

This case involves an employment contract, which is a contract for services. Therefore, the common law of contracts governs, not the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).

Contract Formation

A valid contract requires mutual assent (offer and acceptance) and consideration.

  • Offer: Delta High's principal telephoned Phil and offered him a one-year temporary position as head of the science department at a salary of $80,000.

  • Acceptance: Phil initially stated, "I'm only interested if I can be head of the science department." This could be seen as setting a condition or clarifying the offer he was willing to accept. The principal responded, "Perfect! ... half-time teaching and half-time administration." This likely constituted a specific offer for the Head of Department role with mixed duties. Phil then unequivocally stated, "I accept." This appears to form a contract based on the specific terms discussed orally (Head of Department, $80k, mixed duties, Aug '23 - June '24).

  • Consideration: Phil promised his services (teaching and administration), and Delta High promised to pay $80,000. Valid consideration exists.

Based on the phone call, there appears to be mutual assent to a contract for Phil to serve as temporary Head of the Science Department with both teaching and administrative duties.

Statute of Frauds (SoF)

The Statute of Frauds requires certain types of contracts to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged to be enforceable.

The SoF applies to contracts that, by their terms, cannot be fully performed within one year from the date of their making. Phil's contract was formed around March/April 2023 and was set to run from August 2023 to June 2024. Performance would conclude more than one year after the initial agreement was made (e.g., March 2023 to June 2024 > 1 year). Therefore, this contract falls within the SoF and requires a sufficient writing.

Effect of the May Form

Delta High might argue the May form constitutes the written contract, making prior oral evidence inadmissible under the Parol Evidence Rule and potentially defining the terms. However, this argument is weak. The contract was formed during the phone call when mutual assent was reached. The form arrived later, initiated by Delta High primarily for payroll purposes. Although signed by the principal when sent, Phil only signed and returned it later as requested. Therefore, even with both signatures eventually, the form doesn't automatically supersede the prior oral agreement as a fully integrated writing intended by both parties to be the final expression of their deal, especially regarding the crucial job role. It appears more administrative or, at best, a unilateral attempt by Delta to introduce terms (like "duties at the discretion of the School") that contradict the specific, agreed-upon Head of Department role. Phil can argue the oral agreement is the contract and the form either fails to satisfy the SoF regarding the essential term of his position or its contradictory terms are ineffective modifications.

Promissory Estoppel as an Exception to SoF

Even if the SoF is not satisfied by the oral agreement combined perhaps with the form, Phil might argue for enforcement based on promissory estoppel. This requires: (1) a promise made by the defendant; (2) defendant's reasonable expectation that the plaintiff would rely on the promise; (3) plaintiff's actual and reasonable reliance on the promise to their detriment; and (4) injustice can only be avoided by enforcing the promise.

Here, (1) Delta's principal promised Phil the Head of Department position. (2) Delta should have reasonably expected Phil to rely, especially since obtaining administrative experience was his stated goal. (3) Phil detrimentally relied by taking a one-year leave of absence from his job at City High based on Delta's promise. (4) Injustice would result if Phil is left without either job for the year due to his reliance on Delta's promise.

Therefore, Phil has a strong argument for promissory estoppel to overcome the SoF defense due to his clear detrimental reliance.

2. Phil's Available Remedies

If Phil prevails, he would likely be entitled to remedies designed to compensate him for the breach, primarily expectation damages.

Expectation Damages

Expectation damages aim to put Phil in the financial position he would have been in had Delta High performed the contract. Generally, this means receiving the value of the promised salary ($80,000) minus any amount Phil earned (or reasonably could have earned) through mitigation efforts. Phil had a duty to mitigate his damages by seeking comparable employment. He rejected Delta's teaching-only offer and a $40,000 coaching job at City High, ultimately taking a $30,000 gardening job. A key issue is whether the $40,000 coaching job was comparable employment; Phil can argue it wasn't, given his goal of gaining administrative experience. If his mitigation (taking the $30k job) was reasonable, damages are $80k - $30k = $50k. If rejecting the $40k job was unreasonable, damages are $80k - $40k = $40k.

Specific Performance

Specific performance is an equitable remedy compelling a party to perform their contractual obligations. It may be available when monetary damages are inadequate to compensate the non-breaching party. Here, Phil's expectation damages calculated as his lost salary less mitigation, appear fully adequate to compensate him for the financial loss caused by Delta High's breach. Furthermore, specific performance is particularly unnecessary here because the contract was only for a one-year temporary position, a relatively short duration, making monetary compensation a more practical and suitable remedy.

Conclusion

Phil's most likely remedy is expectation damages. These would likely be calculated as his promised $80,000 salary minus his actual earnings from the gardening job ($30,000), resulting in $50,000. This assumes his rejection of the $40,000 coaching job constituted reasonable mitigation because coaching was not comparable employment given his specific career objectives and the nature of the promised position at Delta High. If a court were to find the coaching job was sufficiently comparable and his rejection unreasonable, his damages would be limited to $40,000.

(950 words)

· 阅读需 5 分钟

1

The primary question regarding Lender's mortgage is whether Carlos took title to the house subject to it. The jurisdiction operates under a race-notice recording act. This type of statute protects a subsequent purchaser who pays value for property, takes without notice of a prior conflicting interest, and records their own deed before the prior interest is recorded. When Barry bought the house from Allison, Lender's mortgage had not yet been recorded. Barry paid market price, satisfying the value requirement. Nothing suggests Barry had actual knowledge or was on inquiry notice of the mortgage. Because Lender's mortgage was unrecorded when Barry recorded his deed, Barry also lacked constructive notice. Since Barry was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice who recorded first, he acquired title from Allison free and clear of Lender's unrecorded mortgage under the race-notice statute.

Later, Barry sold the house to Carlos. By the time Carlos finalized his purchase, Lender's mortgage had been recorded for several weeks. In a jurisdiction using a parcel index system, this proper recording provided constructive notice to the world, including Carlos, regardless of whether he actually knew about it. Therefore, Carlos himself does not qualify as a bona fide purchaser without notice relative to Lender's mortgage.

However, Carlos is protected by the Shelter Rule. This common law doctrine allows a grantee who acquires property from a bona fide purchaser (like Barry) to stand in the shoes of their grantor. Carlos takes the same protection against the prior interest (Lender's mortgage) that his grantor, Barry, enjoyed. The purpose of this rule is to ensure the BFP (Barry) can freely transfer the good title he obtained. Even though Carlos had constructive notice of the mortgage when he purchased, he acquired title from Barry, who had already defeated Lender's interest under the recording act. Consequently, Carlos took title to the house free from Lender's mortgage, and Lender's action against Carlos should fail.

2

Carlos's Potential Claims Against Barry Under the General Warranty Deed Carlos received a general warranty deed from Barry. This type of deed contains several covenants, or promises, about the quality of title being conveyed. These typically include present covenants (breached, if at all, at the time of conveyance) like the covenant against encumbrances, and future covenants (breached upon later interference) like the covenant of quiet enjoyment and the covenant of warranty.

Carlos might consider claiming Barry breached the covenant against encumbrances because Lender's mortgage existed and was recorded when Barry sold the house to Carlos. However, an encumbrance must typically be a valid claim against the property to breach the covenant. As established above, due to Barry's status as a BFP who recorded first, Lender's mortgage was legally unenforceable against the title Barry acquired and subsequently conveyed to Carlos. An unenforceable lien generally does not constitute a breach of the covenant against encumbrances. Similarly, Barry did own the property (seisin) and had the right to convey it free of Lender's claim. Thus, the present covenants were likely not breached.

Carlos might also look to the future covenants due to Lender's lawsuit. The covenants of quiet enjoyment and warranty promise that the grantee will not be disturbed by, and the grantor will defend against, lawful claims of superior title. While Lender's lawsuit is certainly a disturbance to Carlos's possession, the claim itself is not lawful or superior against Carlos's title, thanks to the Shelter Rule. Because Lender's claim should ultimately be defeated, Barry's obligations under the future covenants likely have not been triggered. Therefore, Carlos probably has no successful claim against Barry under the general warranty deed based on Lender's mortgage or the resulting lawsuit.

3

The question of Barry's liability for the air conditioning unit turns on whether the unit was a fixture or remained personal property. A fixture is an item of personal property that has been attached to real property in such a way that it becomes legally regarded as part of the real property itself, passing with the land to a buyer. Courts determine fixture status by looking at the method of attachment, the item's adaptation to the use of the property, and, most importantly, the objective intention of the party who installed it.

Here, the AC unit was installed by Allison to improve kitchen ventilation. It was "screwed to a bracket mounted through an exterior wall." This method suggests a fairly permanent installation requiring penetration of the building structure, and its removal would likely leave holes or other damage. The unit was adapted to the house's use by providing cooling and ventilation. Objectively, installing such a unit suggests an intention to make a permanent improvement to the habitability and value of the house. In disputes between a seller and buyer of real estate, courts often presume that items attached in this manner by the owner were intended to remain with the property unless specified otherwise. Since the sales contract between Barry and Carlos was silent on the unit, the analysis points towards it being a fixture.

As a fixture, the AC unit became part of the real property that Barry owned and subsequently contracted to sell to Carlos. Barry's removal of the unit the day before closing, without any agreement allowing him to do so, meant he failed to deliver the property in the condition agreed upon (which includes fixtures). Therefore, Barry is likely liable to Carlos for the value of the air conditioning unit he improperly removed.

(900 words)

· 阅读需 5 分钟

1

Under California law, a will or part of a will can be revoked by a subsequent testamentary instrument or by a physical act performed by the testator with revocatory intent. Physical acts include burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will or a portion thereof. Here, Tammy's act of crossing out the "$10,000" figure qualifies as a physical act of cancellation or obliteration, which effectively revoked the original $10,000 bequest.

The issue then becomes the effectiveness of the handwritten "$20,000" figure. While Tammy clearly intended to increase Natalie's gift, this handwritten interlineation does not meet the formal requirements for executing a valid will or codicil under California law. It lacks the necessary witness signatures (unless considered a valid holographic modification, which requires the material provisions to be in the testator's handwriting – here, only the amount, initials, and date are handwritten, likely insufficient). Therefore, the attempt to bequeath $20,000 is invalid.

The situation – where a testator revokes a gift intending to replace it with another that ultimately fails – triggers the doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation (DRR). DRR operates under the presumption that the testator would prefer the original gift to stand rather than have the revocation take effect if the intended replacement fails. It applies when the revocation is conditional upon the validity of the new disposition. Here, it seems highly probable that Tammy crossed out the $10,000 only because she believed she was effectively substituting it with $20,000. Her intent was clearly to benefit Natalie, likely more generously. She would presumably not have wanted Natalie to receive nothing, which would be the result if the revocation stood alone. Because the attempted $20,000 gift is invalid, DRR allows the court to disregard the revocation (the crossing out) as being dependent on a mistaken belief (that the new amount was validly bequeathed). Consequently, the court will likely reinstate the original provision, and Natalie will receive the $10,000 initially specified in the validly executed will.

2

The primary goal in will interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the testator's intent. While the plain meaning of terms is a starting point, California law permits the consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret a will's terms, even if they are not ambiguous on their face, to determine the testator's intent.

Here, the term "coin collection" presents a latent ambiguity when applied to the specific property Tammy owned and how she maintained it. Several pieces of evidence suggest Tammy intended Frank to receive the medals. First, she stored the medals together with the coins in the same album. This physical integration suggests she viewed them as a single collection or unit for practical purposes, regardless of technical definitions. Second, and more significantly, the album contained a typewritten note signed by Tammy stating she wanted Frank "to take care of her album" after her death. While this note likely cannot be formally incorporated by reference into the will (as the will doesn't mention it and it may not have existed when the will was signed), it serves as powerful extrinsic evidence of Tammy's intent regarding the album's contents. Her specific reference to the "album" strongly implies she intended Frank to possess everything within it, which includes both the coins and the medals.

Although most collectors differentiate between coins and medals, Tammy's personal classification and intent, as evidenced by her storage practices and the separate signed note directed at Frank concerning the album, are paramount. The court will likely find that Tammy used the term "coin collection" loosely to refer to the entire contents of the album she curated. Therefore, prioritizing Tammy's specific intent demonstrated through extrinsic evidence, the court will likely rule that Frank inherits both the coins and the medals contained within the album.

3

California has adopted the doctrine of cy pres by statute, allowing a court to modify the terms of a charitable trust if its original purpose becomes impossible, impracticable, unlawful, or wasteful. For cy pres to apply, the court must find that the testator had a general charitable intent, broader than the specific purpose stated. If the intent was solely limited to the narrow purpose which has failed, the trust would fail, and the funds would pass to the testator's heirs or under the residuary clause (though here, this is the residuary clause).

Courts often presume a general charitable intent unless the will clearly indicates otherwise. Tammy dedicated her entire residuary estate to this trust, suggesting a significant commitment to a charitable cause related to RG syndrome and eyesight. While "finding a cure" is specific, it falls under the broader category of combating eye disease and promoting eye health. The absence of a gift-over provision (specifying what happens if the trust purpose fails) further supports the inference of a general charitable intent.

Here, the court must determine if NTC's proposed modification – funding ophthalmology scholarships – aligns with Tammy's general charitable intent and is "as near as possible" to the original purpose. Supporting education in ophthalmology directly relates to eye health and the prevention or treatment of eye diseases like RG syndrome, albeit through a different mechanism (education vs. research for a specific cure). It benefits the same field of medicine and ultimately aids those with vision impairment. This proposed purpose appears to be a suitable and analogous application of the funds within Tammy's likely general charitable intent to combat eye disease.

Therefore, the court is likely to find that Tammy possessed a general charitable intent related to eye health, that the original purpose is impossible, and that NTC's proposed modification is appropriate under the cy pres doctrine. The court will likely grant NTC's petition to change the trust's purpose to establishing ophthalmology scholarships.

(920 words)

· 阅读需 4 分钟

1

The analysis begins with Rob's first statement, "Yes, it was me," made in the restaurant. Rob will argue this statement is inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment based on Miranda v. Arizona. He was clearly subjected to a custodial interrogation without the requisite warnings. Officer Otto, uniformed and armed, ordered Rob not to move and to keep his hands visible. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, establishing custody. Officer Otto's direct question about whether Rob was the robber constituted interrogation, as it was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Since Rob was subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, his confession must be suppressed as a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. While the prosecution might suggest this was merely an investigative detention or invoke the public safety exception, the level of restraint indicates custody, and the question asked pertained directly to guilt rather than an immediate safety threat like the gun's specific location, making these counterarguments weak. Therefore, this initial confession is likely inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.

2

Next, we consider Rob's statement at the police station revealing the location of the stolen money. This statement occurred two hours after the initial encounter, following proper Miranda warnings and an affirmative waiver by Rob. Rob will argue this statement should also be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree," tainted by the initial Miranda violation. He might contend that the unwarned confession psychologically compelled the later one, or that the police employed an improper "question first, warn later" tactic.

However, courts generally permits the admission of a statement obtained after proper Miranda warnings and waiver, even if preceded by an unwarned but voluntary statement. Here, there is no indication Rob's initial statement was coerced. Furthermore, the significant time lapse (two hours), the change in location (from restaurant to police station), and the formal administration of Miranda rights serve to attenuate the connection between the initial violation and the subsequent, warned confession. This break in the stream of events distinguishes the situation from the deliberate, continuous interrogation strategy. Thus, Rob's voluntary waiver after receiving proper warnings likely renders his statement about the money admissible.

3

Regarding the gun found in the briefcase, Rob will challenge its admissibility under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Under the Fourth Amendment, he will argue Officer Otto conducted a warrantless search of the briefcase, in which Rob had a reasonable expectation of privacy. He will contend that no warrant exception applied. A search incident to lawful arrest (SILA) might be questionable if the search preceded the formal arrest, or if the briefcase was deemed outside Rob's immediate control once Officer Otto confronted him. Rob might also argue the gun is suppressible as physical fruit derived from the unwarned statement under the Fifth Amendment. The prosecution, however, has compelling counterarguments. The Miranda rule does not require suppression of physical evidence discovered due to a voluntary but unwarned statement. Furthermore, under the Fourth Amendment, the prosecution can argue the gun would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means. This doctrine provides a strong basis for admitting the gun, irrespective of the timing or exact justification for the search at the restaurant.

4

Finally, the admissibility of the stolen money seized from Rob's apartment depends largely on the admissibility of his second statement. Rob will argue that if his statement revealing the money's location is suppressed, then the search warrant based on that statement lacks probable cause, rendering the search unlawful and the money inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. However, as previously discussed, Rob's second statement made at the station after a valid Miranda waiver is likely admissible. Because this statement lawfully provided the probable cause presented in the affidavit, the resulting search warrant was valid. The officers' search of Rob's apartment was conducted pursuant to this valid warrant, conforming to Fourth Amendment requirements. Therefore, the stolen money seized during this lawful search is almost certainly admissible. The connection to the initial unwarned statement is sufficiently attenuated by the subsequent valid waiver and the intervening judicial authorization of the warrant.

In conclusion, while Rob is likely to succeed in suppressing his initial statement "Yes, it was me" due to a Miranda violation, his subsequent statement about the money, the gun found in the briefcase, and the stolen money recovered from his apartment are all likely to be deemed admissible against him at trial.

(765 words)

· 阅读需 2 分钟

在袁律师组织下,新生代的学员分别在4月18日和4月24日于上海领事馆进行了两次美签团签。袁律师给所有人开具了推荐信。从结果看,通过率比自行去签证要稍高一些(大于80%),尤其是24日的团,通过了许多白本和有拒签记录的团员。但也有一些学员被拒签,集中在:

  • 福建户籍

  • 白本

  • DS-160填表瑕疵,本次因为人数过多,我们无法一一审核学员的DS-160表格,只是尽可能提供了填表指南和答疑

  • 有过拒签记录,且本次出境理由和上次不符的

我们积累了宝贵的美签团签经验,并预计会在下半年在广州再举办一次团签。欢迎大家届时报名参加。建议被拒签的学员提前去周边国家刷刷旅游记录。